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CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND THE UNLAWFUL MEANS 
TORT: IS THERE A RIGHT TO TRADE? 
Kerry Sun* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the extent to which the theory of corrective 
justice can account for the purpose, structure, and elements of the tort 
of unlawful interference with economic relations. It considers various 
proposed accounts of the tort, contending that the tort cannot be 
justified as an exception to the privity doctrine, a response to the 
defendant’s attempts to assert indirect control over the plaintiff, or a 
form of liability stretching. Extending a proposed account of the tort 
based on the theory of abuse of rights, this paper develops the idea of 
a “right to trade” that is founded on the conception of rights, remedies, 
and the systematicity of the legal order underlying corrective justice.  
The right to trade expresses each person’s equal opportunity to 
transact with others as abstract, self-determining beings in an 
omnilateral structure of relations—a juridical conception of the 
market. The paper argues that the unlawful means tort serves to 
protect this right, which is correlative to a duty on everyone not to 
interfere with the plaintiff’s equal status as a participant in the market. 
This conception of the tort provides a coherent account of its main 
features and situates it within the overall theory of corrective justice. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Since the trilogy of cases launched by Mogul Steamship, a coherent, principled 
theory of the economic torts has eluded courts and commentators alike.1 In 
recent years, these torts have attracted critical attention due to their increasing use 
by litigants, especially in the context of market competition.2 The theoretical 
controversy surrounding this genus of torts has persisted alongside influential 
articulations of what is perhaps the most illuminating standpoint on private law—
the theory of corrective justice.3 The goal of this paper is to investigate the extent 
to which this theory can account for one such tort, specifically the tort of unlawful 
interference with economic relations. I argue that despite its apparent 
inconsistencies with the bilateral, correlative framework that the theory posits, 
the tort can be justified as an expression of the idea of systematicity immanent in 
corrective justice. This conception of the tort provides a coherent account of its 
main features and situates it within the overall theory of corrective justice. 
Section I of this paper describes the tort of unlawful interference with 
economic relations, also known as the “unlawful means” tort, and the difficulties 
it raises for the corrective justice approach. Section II canvasses proposed 
justifications of the purpose, structure, and elements of this tort. From a 
corrective justice perspective, I argue, the tort cannot be explained as (1) an 
exception to the privity doctrine, (2) a response to the defendant’s attempts to 
assert ‘indirect control’ over the plaintiff, or (3) a form of ‘liability stretching’. 
Section III considers another compelling proposal: that the tort is a manifestation 
of the doctrine of abuse of rights. I contend that this proposal is incomplete in 
an important respect. It casts the right protected by the unlawful means tort as a 
premise to practical reasoning, rather than as a conclusion. What is needed is a 
specification of the form and content of the right-duty relationship that inheres 
in the tort. 
 
1 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co, [1892] AC 25 (HL (Eng)) [Mogul Steamship]; Allen v Flood, 
[1898] AC 1 (HL (Eng)); Quinn v Leathem, [1901] AC 495 (HL (Eng)). See Peter T Burns & Joost Blom, 
Economic Torts in Canada, 2nd ed (Canada: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2016) at §1.89; Hazel Carty, An Analysis of 
the Economic Torts, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [Analysis]. 
2 Hazel Carty, “The Modern Functions of the Economic Torts: Reviewing the English, Canadian, Australian, 
and New Zealand Positions” (2015) 74:2 Camb LJ 261 at 264 [“Modern Functions”]. 
3 Christopher Essert, “Thinking Like a Private Lawyer” (2018) 68:1 UTLJ 166 at 185. 
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In Section IV, I elaborate on the “abuse of right” proposal by drawing on 
the notion of “public right” as developed by theorists of corrective justice. Within 
the condition of public right, the norms of corrective justice are secured through 
public institutions that relate persons to each other under a system of laws. I argue 
that the form of the right protected by the unlawful means tort is the plaintiff’s 
“right to trade,” which is correlative to a duty on everyone not to infringe a status 
conferred upon the plaintiff. The content of the right to trade, I claim, is each 
person’s equal opportunity to transact with others as abstract, self-determining 
beings in an omnilateral structure of relations—a juridical conception of the 
market. Section V applies this theory to the unlawful means tort and discusses its 
implications for the elements of the tort. The paper concludes that the unlawful 
means tort can, in fact, be reconciled with the corrective justice approach to 
private law. 
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
The Framework of Corrective Justice 
Corrective justice is arguably the most prominent non-instrumentalist 
approach to the understanding of Anglo-American private law today. As 
described by some of its leading proponents, the theory of corrective justice is an 
account of “the relational structure of reasoning in private law.”4 In contrast to 
instrumentalist or policy-based accounts, the central claim of the theory is that 
the Aristotelian ideal of corrective justice, along with a conception of abstract 
right as the normative basis of relations between persons, provides a coherent 
explanation for the features of private law.5 As the Supreme Court of Canada has 
recognized, corrective justice is an underlying idea that animates private law.6 In 
 
4 Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 2 [CJ]; Ernest J Weinrib, The 
Idea of Private Law, revised ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at ch 3 [IPL]; Arthur Ripstein, Private 
Wrongs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016) at 4 [PW]. See also Ernest J Weinrib, “Corrective Justice 
in a Nutshell” (2002) 52 UTLJ 349 at 351 [“Nutshell”]. 
5 Ernest J Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 18-19. 
6 Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Department of Finance), 2007 SCC 1 at para 32; Clements 
v Clements, 2012 SCC 32 at para 7; Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v JJ, 2018 SCC 19 at para 63. See also 
Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, 2002 SCC 18 at para 152, LeBel J; Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 
2014 SCC 62 at para 189, Abella J. 
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this paper, I refer to corrective justice not simply in terms of the definition of the 
form of its relational structure, but also as encompassing the theory’s account of 
the substantive content of this structure.7 
The “paradigmatic and central form” of corrective justice’s reasoning has 
been described as the idea of “correlativity,” “bipolarity,” or “bilaterality.”8 This 
idea encapsulates the understanding of private law as embodying “a correlative or 
relational form of normativity,” in that the law conceptualizes the parties as doer 
and sufferer of the same injustice.9 Applied to tort law, a key normative claim 
flowing from this thesis is that liability responds to a private wrong, understood 
as the defendant’s infringement of the plaintiff’s right. That is, the plaintiff’s 
normative loss is matched by the defendant’s equivalent normative gain.10 Both 
sides of the transaction are related to each other on this account, such that the 
remedy provided by tort law “consists not in two independent operations . . . but 
in a single operation that joins the parties as obligee and obliger.”11 
Under the corrective justice framework, the concept of “personality” 
represents the “normative standpoint” that articulates the regime of rights and 
duties implicit in private law.12 Private law conceptualizes persons as notionally 
equal in the sense that each possesses an abstract personality. The equality 
conferred by this juridical understanding of personality is the normative baseline 
that defines when an injustice has occurred.13 The most prominent accounts of 
this theory posit the Kantian14 and Hegelian15 conception of rights and juridical 
personality as substantiating the normative standpoint appropriate to corrective 
justice. On this view, a private law right is the “juridical manifestation of a 
person’s freedom with respect to the actions of another.”16 These rights outline 
 
7 Cf Stephen R Perry, “Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective 
Justice” in Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, eds, Tort Theory (North York: Captus Press Inc, 1993) 
24 at 24-25, 30-31 [“Conceptions”]; John Gardner, “What is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place of Corrective 
Justice” (2011) 30:1 Law & Phil 1 at 22-24. 
8 Essert, supra note 3 at 167. 
9 Ibid at 171; Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 2. 
10 Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 7. 
11 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 143. 
12 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 11-12. 
13 Ibid at 16. See also Weinrib, “Nutshell,” supra note 4 at 349. 
14 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at ch 4. 
15 See e.g. Peter Benson, “The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice” (1992) 77:2 
Iowa L Rev 515. 
16 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 124. 
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a particular conception of free and equal persons under private law, a feature of 
which is indifference to a person’s internal “needs, wishes or advantage,” as 
opposed to his or her “externally manifested choice.”17 Thus, corrective justice is 
not merely the remedial idea that private law liability occurs when a right is 
violated and a duty breached. Its conception of juridical personality posits, at an 
abstract level, the content of those rights and duties.18 In what follows, I consider 
the unlawful means tort and the problems it poses for this theory of private law. 
The Tort of Unlawful Interference 
Having been neglected for a number of years, the economic torts have 
recently received high appellate treatment in England and Canada. In OBG Ltd v 
Allan (“OBG”),19 the House of Lords reorganized these torts.20 Lord Hoffmann, 
delivering the leading judgment, conspicuously rejected the “unified theory” of 
the economic torts. Instead, he favoured a disaggregated approach that separated 
the causes of action of inducing breach of contract and of unlawful interference 
with economic relations.21 Unlike inducing breach of contract, the unlawful 
means tort “is a tort of primary liability” rather than accessory liability.22 The 
House of Lords later confirmed this approach in relation to unlawful means 
conspiracy in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL,23 which 
clarified that the unlawful means tort and tort of conspiracy “are different in their 
nature, and the interests of justice may require their development on somewhat 
different bases.”24 
This paper focuses on the “radically under-theorized” tort of unlawful 
interference with economic relations.25 Limited to “a three-party setting,” the tort 
 
17 Peter Benson, “Equality of Opportunity and Private Law” in Dan Friedmann & Daphne Barak -Erez, eds, 
Human Rights in Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 201 at 211 [“Equality of Opportunity”]. 
18 See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 6-7. 
19 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 [OBG]. 
20 Roderick Bagshaw, “Lord Hoffmann and the Economic Torts” in Paul S Davies & Justine Pila, eds, The 
Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann: A Festschrift in Honour of Lord Leonard Hoffmann (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 
59 at 59. See also Edwin Peel & James Goudkamp, eds, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 19th ed (London, UK: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at para 19-021 [Winfield & Jolowicz]. 
21 OBG, supra note 19 at para 32. 
22 Ibid at para 8; Winfield & Jolowicz, supra note 20 at para 19-019. 
23 [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 [Total Network]. 
24 Ibid at para 123. See also ibid at paras 100, 223. 
25 AI Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd, 2014 SCC 12 at para 36 [AI Enterprises]. 
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imposes liability where the defendant has committed a wrong against a third party, 
with the intention of harming the plaintiff.26 In OBG, Lord Hoffmann articulated 
the elements of this tort: 
The essence of this tort therefore appears to be (a) a wrongful 
interference with the actions of a third party in which the 
claimant has an economic interest and (b) an intention thereby 
to cause loss to the claimant.27 
First, the defendant must have employed “unlawful means” against a third 
party, that is, a wrong that is “actionable by that third party.”28 The defendant’s 
act must interfere with “the freedom of a third party . . . to deal with the claimant,”29 
or, in another formulation also adopted by Lord Hoffmann, with “the liberty of 
action of a third party” in relation to the plaintiff.30 Second, the requisite intention 
for the tort is satisfied where “[o]ne intends to cause loss even though it is the means 
by which one achieved the end of enriching oneself,” but not where the loss was 
“merely a foreseeable consequence of one’s actions.”31 
Subsequently, this reorganization and the elements of the tort were largely 
imported to Canada in AI Enterprises Ltd. v Bram Enterprises Ltd. (“AI Enterprises”). 
The Supreme Court characterized the unlawful means tort as “parasitic”: 
Liability to the plaintiff is based on (or parasitic upon) the 
defendant’s unlawful act against the third party. While the 
elements of the tort have been described in a number of ways, 
its core captures the intentional infliction of economic injury on 
C (the plaintiff) by A (the defendant)’s use of unlawful means 
against B (the third party).32 
Justice Cromwell, writing for the Court, agreed with Lord Hoffmann that the 
“unlawful means” element is only satisfied where the defendant commits an 
“actionable civil wrong” against the third party.33 Declining to adopt the 
 
26 Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 18. 
27 OBG, supra note 19 at para 47. 
28 Ibid at para 49. 
29 Ibid at para 51 [emphasis added]. See also ibid at para 320. 
30 Ibid at paras 48, 53 [emphasis added]. See also Bagshaw, supra note 20 at 63ff. 
31 Ibid at para 62 [emphasis added]. 
32 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 23. 
33 Ibid at para 74. 
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respondents’ submissions proposing a broader definition of an “unlawful” 
means, he agreed with the House of Lords that it was inappropriate to “tortify” 
criminal and regulatory law “by imposing civil liability where there would not 
otherwise be any.”34 
Notably, however, Cromwell J departed from OBG by dismissing the 
requirement that the unlawful means “must interfere with the third party’s 
freedom to deal with the plaintiff.”35 In his view, it was unnecessary to “resort to 
this additional ‘freedom to deal’ qualification”: 
Whether the unlawful means interfere with the plaintiff’s right 
to deal with the injured third party or with some other party, the 
fact that the defendant aims at the plaintiff provides a sufficient 
nexus between the unlawful means and the interests of the 
plaintiff to justify imposing liability.36 
In part, this departure stemmed from Cromwell J’s view that the “best rationale” 
for the tort is “liability stretching.”37 In his view, this rationale “sees the tort as 
extending civil liability without creating new actionable wrongs” by “extending 
an existing right to sue from the immediate victim of the unlawful act” to the 
plaintiff targeted by the defendant.38  
The Problems Posed for Corrective Justice 
As articulated in OBG and AI Enterprises, the unlawful means tort appears 
to pose three problems for corrective justice theory. First, the tort provides the 
plaintiff standing to sue a defendant that committed an actionable wrong against 
a third party, even though it is not immediately evident that the defendant has 
breached a right of the plaintiff. Even if the defendant’s act causes a third party 
to terminate its economic relationship with the plaintiff, one might object that 
the third party’s free choice to do so cannot, in itself, generate liability by the 
 
34 Ibid at paras 26, 45. 
35 Ibid at para 87. See also Pey-Woan Lee, “The Unlawful Means Tort in Canada” (2014) 130 Law Q Rev 559 
at 562. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at para 49. 
38 Ibid at paras 37, 43. 
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defendant to the plaintiff.39 Rather, some primary right must be identified in the 
plaintiff.40 Otherwise, the tort would violate the basic principle of privity by 
allowing the plaintiff to recover for a wrongful act suffered by a third party.41 The 
problem is compounded by the fact that the tort contemplates recovery for pure 
economic loss.42 As a rights-based account of private law, corrective justice 
requires the plaintiff to establish a juridical right vis-à-vis the defendant in order to 
recover economic loss resulting from the latter’s interference with the right.43 
However, a person “cannot have a possessory or property right in the continued 
custom or business of others.”44 If such a right did exist, the perverse implication 
would be that any market competition could attract liability. 
Second, the role of the “unlawful means” element in Cromwell J’s 
formulation of the tort is arguably inconsistent with the bilaterality of private law. 
On the one hand, this element distinguishes the unlawful means tort from the 
American “prima facie tort” developed in Tuttle v Buck.45 Unlike the Anglo-
Canadian tort, the prima facie tort imposes liability for “intentionally causing 
damage without using unlawful means,” unless the defendant’s act can be shown 
to be justified.46 The corrective justice approach does not countenance this 
imposition of liability, since it permits recovery for damnum absque injuria.47 On the 
other hand, some commentators have criticized the unlawful means element as 
“an arbitrary and illogical limit” on the development of the tort.48 
In AI Enterprises, Cromwell J portrayed the unlawful means element as part 
of “a sufficient nexus” that would “justify imposing liability” on the defendant.49 
 
39 Peter Benson, “Misfeasance as an Organizing Normative Idea in Private Law” (2010) 60:3 UTLJ 731 at 
741 [“Misfeasance”]. 
40 Allan Beever, A Theory of Tort Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) at 137 [ATTL]. 
41 JW Neyers, “Rights-based justifications for the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations” 
(2008) 28:2 LS 215 at 222 [“Rights-based justifications”]. 
42 JW Neyers, “The economic torts as corrective justice” (2009) 17 Torts LJ 162 at 166 [“Economic torts”]. 
See e.g. Hardie Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Ahern (No 3), [2010] WASC 403 at para 706 [Hardie]. 
43 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 166; Peter Benson, “The Problem with Pure Economic Loss” 
(2009) 60:4 SCL Rev 823 at 845. 
44 Benson, “Misfeasance,” supra note 39 at 740. 
45 Tuttle v Buck, 119 NW 949 (1909). See Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 84-85. 
46 OBG, supra note 19 at para 145. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§767-68 (1979). 
47 “Loss or harm that is incurred from something other than a wrongful act and occasions no legal remedy.” 
Bryan A Garner et al, eds, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2014) sub verbo 
“damnum absque injuria.” 
48 Tony Weir, Economic Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 21 n 1. See also ibid at para 146. 
49 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 87. 
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Yet, that role is incompatible with corrective justice’s requirement of an 
“articulated unity” of the plaintiff’s right and defendant’s duty, which unites the 
parties in one moral transaction.50 On the logic of his analysis, the unlawful means 
requirement seems to pertain only to the defendant’s side of the transaction. This 
rationale is arguably inconsistent with the parties’ transactional equality. By 
founding liability upon the defendant’s unlawful act, even if it is aimed at the 
plaintiff, he refers to a merely factual and not juridical nexus between the parties.51 
As Weinrib explains: 
[It cannot be that] the entire justificatory weight of the 
relationship rests on the reason for considering the defendant to 
be under a duty; right is then immediately attributed to anyone 
who would benefit from the performance of that duty.52 
To be intelligible as an expression of corrective justice, the tort must be theorized 
in a manner that accounts for how it protects “a person’s freedom with respect 
to the actions of another.”53 
Third, insofar as the existence and elements of the tort are justified as a 
judicial instrument to prevent “excessive competitive conflict,”54 it raises 
concerns about the extent to which a corrective justice approach can 
accommodate distributive considerations. The regulation of commercial 
behaviour is generally understood to be a question of the welfare of the 
community as a whole. Such matters belong to distributive justice, a domain that 
courts have traditionally avoided, particularly in the adjudication of private legal 
disputes.55 For this reason, Lord Hoffmann cautioned that the tort “was designed 
only to enforce basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition, 
between traders or between employers and labour.”56 The concerns about the 
appropriateness of common law tools in intervening in this area may be 
 
50 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 123. 
51 See ibid at 124-25. 
52 Ibid at 124. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Carty, “Modern Functions,” supra note 2 at 277. 
55 Ross Grantham & Darryn Jensen, “The Proper Role of Policy in Private Law Adjudication” (2018) 68:2 
UTLJ 187 at 191, 198-201. See also Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 210. 
56 OBG, supra note 19 at para 56 [emphasis added]. 
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warranted.57 If the primary justification for this economic tort is a strictly 
regulatory function, then it would be inappropriate from a corrective justice 
perspective. In light of these observations, the next section of the paper considers 
various proposed rationalizations of the unlawful means tort. 
PROPOSED ACCOUNTS OF THE UNLAWFUL MEANS TORT 
Principled Exceptions to the Privity Rule 
In response to the observation that the tort does not appear to pertain to a 
right of the plaintiff, two explanations have been advanced. Both of these 
accounts can be broadly categorized as justifying the tort as an exception to the 
privity rule in private law. Normally, the privity rule limits standing to sue to a 
plaintiff whose right was violated.58 First, Robert Stevens has argued that an 
exception to the rule “may be justified on the basis that it prevents [the defendant] 
from using others as means to his own ends.”59 He argues that the unlawful means 
tort is such an exception. Still, he maintains that “the general rule . . . discloses 
the structure of the law of torts,” and he considers the tort to be unproblematic 
because the defendant’s commission of an independently actionable wrong must 
be established.60 Indeed, it might even be accepted that, as a descriptive matter, 
the modern function of the unlawful means tort is to accommodate plaintiffs who 
are harmed, but barred from recovery by the privity rule.61 
Second, Daniel Stilitz and Philip Sales have advanced an alternative theory, 
arguing that the defendant’s intention to harm the plaintiff “bridges the 
remoteness of his unlawful actions.”62 Citing Lord Lindley’s opinion in Quinn v 
Leathem, they claim that liability is imposed by virtue of this bridging mechanism: 
the defendant’s intention to harm the plaintiff enables the latter “to overcome 
the defence . . . that D’s unlawful conduct is remote from P.”63 According to their 
 
57 See Hardie, supra note 42 at para 707. See also Carty, “Modern Functions,” supra note 2 at 283. 
58 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 173. 
59 Ibid at 188. 
60 Ibid at 174, 188-89. 
61 Carty, “Modern Functions,” supra note 2 at 277. 
62 Daniel Stilitz & Philip Sales, “Intentional infliction of harm by unlawful means” (1999) 115 Law Q Rev 
411 at 413. 
63 Ibid at 412, citing Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 534-35. 
Vol. 28 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 177 
 
“remoteness theory,” the plaintiff needs only to show that he or she suffered a 
loss—has been “damaged in fact”—due to the defendant’s unlawful conduct 
against the intermediary, including pure economic loss.64 The defendant’s 
requisite state of mind must be “a strict one,” so that it is defensible to impose 
liability “where none would otherwise be recognised by the law.”65 In other 
words, Stilitz and Sales consider the intention element to be a “proximity 
mechanism” that prevents liability from blooming in an undesirable manner.66 As 
such, they conclude that it would suffice that the defendant’s “actuating intent” 
or “purpose” was to cause harm to the plaintiff.67 
These explanations, however, merely sidestep the question of the plaintiff’s 
right that is central to a corrective justice account of the unlawful means tort. 
Although Stevens aims to advance a rights-based theory of tort law, his account 
focuses on the defendant’s wrongdoing and the third party victim, as opposed to 
the plaintiff’s right.68 If his rationale were accepted, it would tend to undermine 
the rights-based account altogether. In truth, the privity exception argument 
amounts to the invocation of a “gap-filling” policy justification that imposes 
liability because the plaintiff would otherwise have no legal recourse.69 It may be, 
as Stevens suggests, that it is in the public interest to deter defendants from 
“deliberately using others.”70 The privity exception he proposes effectively 
deputizes a plaintiff to undertake the deterrence function by permitting him or 
her to recover from the defendant. Nonetheless, it is less clear why a rights-based 
account of tort law would countenance this explanation, given its inability to 
identify a pre-existing legal right in the plaintiff exigible against the defendant.71 
Meanwhile, Stilitz and Sales’ account explicitly embraces the gap-filling 
justification. However, they take it for granted that the plaintiff simply has a legal 
right not to suffer any pure economic loss that was factually caused by the 
defendant. In so doing, they fail to justify this extension of liability to protect 
 
64 Ibid at 413, 430-31. 
65 Ibid at 430. 
66 See Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 82. 
67 Stilitz & Sales, supra note 62 at 427, 429. 
68 See James Goudkamp & John Murphy, “The Failure of Universal Theories of Tort Law” (2015) 21:2 Legal 
Theory 47 at 81, n 199 
69 John Murphy, “Rights, Reductionism and Tort Law” (2008) 28:2 Oxford  J Leg Stud 393 at 402. 
70 Stevens, supra note 58 at 188. 
71 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 182. 
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against instances of pure economic loss, despite the fact that Anglo-Canadian tort 
law has “traditionally accorded less protection to purely economic interests than 
to physical integrity and property rights.”72 It has been cogently argued that a right 
not to suffer pure economic loss per se cannot be sustained at private law. One 
reason for this conclusion is that it is impossible to determine what constitutes a 
“loss” in the absence of injury to an underlying right, since whether an event has, 
factually speaking, caused loss could change from moment to moment; an 
apparent loss today could lead to a gain tomorrow.73 
Likewise, the proposal that the defendant’s intention “bridges” the gap 
attributes to the intention a normative role that is difficult to explain. It is 
incompatible with bilaterality under corrective justice, for the thesis situates the 
tort exclusively in the defendant’s side of the right-duty relationship. Moreover, 
if intention is the operative proximity mechanism, then the additional 
requirement of unlawful means would be otiose.74 Still, in the face of strong 
academic criticism, the courts have consistently maintained the “key ingredient” 
of unlawful means.75 Thus, the remoteness-bridging theory suffers from 
problems of both fit and coherence in accounting for the unlawful means tort. 
Ultimately, both these proposed exceptions to privity are reducible to 
consequentialist or loss-based considerations, rationales extrinsic to the 
relationship between the parties that is central to corrective justice.76 
Indirect Control 
In a recent work, Allan Beever advances the novel thesis that the economic 
torts, including the unlawful means tort, respond to an interpersonal wrong in the 
defendant’s attempt to exert “indirect control” over the plaintiff through 
coercion.77 His theory of tort, based on Kant’s philosophy of law, views such an 
attempt as a violation of the plaintiff’s “innate right.”78 The Kantian innate right 
refers to one’s external freedom, “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of 
 
72 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 30. 
73 Donal Nolan, “Rights, Damage and Loss” (2017) 37:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 255 at 262-66. 
74 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 181. 
75 Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 102. See also Weir, supra note 48 at 73. 
76 See Murphy, supra note 69 at 403. 
77 Beever, ATTL, supra note 40 at 124. 
78 Ibid. 
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every other in accordance with a universal law.”79 In Beever’s view, the Kantian 
conception of rights supports a person’s entitlement to be free from attempts by 
other persons to gain power or control over his actions, whether directly or 
indirectly. He contends that the “right to trade” referred to in the case law is an 
instance of the Kantian innate right.80 On this account, the defendants in Allen v 
Flood were not held liable because the defendant was not attempting to injure the 
plaintiffs.81 The defendant’s actions were described in the subsequent case of 
Quinn v Leathem as “simply warn[ing] the plaintiff’s employers” of the employee’s 
intended actions.82 In contrast, Beever argues that the defendants in Quinn v 
Leathem were held liable because they “were trying to strike at the plaintiff . . . to 
control the way in which he ran his business.”83 
Beever offers a rights-based account of the tort, which, as a Kantian theory, 
appears to be compatible with the corrective justice framework. It asserts a 
plausible basis for the plaintiff’s right, thereby avoiding the conclusion that the 
plaintiff’s economic loss is damnum absque injuria. Nor does it advert to policy 
justifications to sustain the tort: “[t]he wrong is not the causing of loss, it is 
coercion.”84 The indirect control theory addresses a defect identified in Stilitz and 
Sales’ remoteness theory, which effectively claimed that economic loss was per se 
recoverable. 
Grounded in the view that Kantian right includes a juridical immunity from 
indirect control by others, the theory proposes some refinements to the current 
model of the tort. One important implication is that the unlawful means element 
is unnecessary for liability. Beever claims that this element is merely a “policy-
based control mechanism,” and that the requirement that a third party was 
wronged creates a “logical chasm” between the plaintiff and defendant.85 In his 
view, the parasitic nature of the tort is indefensible. Instead of conditioning the 
plaintiff’s recovery on an actionable wrong to a third party, it should be 
 
79 Ibid at 19-20. See Immanuel Kant, “The metaphysics of morals” in Mary J Gregor, ed, Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 353 at 6:237. 
80 Ibid at 124-25. 
81 Ibid at 127. 
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recognized that the relevant wrong simply is that suffered by the plaintiff.86 For 
this reason, he favours reorienting the tort to focus on the defendant’s intention, 
which he argues must be a purposive intention to exert “control” over the 
plaintiff.87 
Beever’s proposal may appear attractive for its straightforward character, 
though some have criticized it as “monistic” or even “one-dimensional.”88 
Nevertheless, it encounters problems of fit in relation to the features of the 
unlawful means tort. Even accounting for the complex history of the economic 
torts,89 this view requires a significant departure from the conventional definition 
of the tort. As mentioned above, some of the earliest formulations of this tort 
included the requirement of an unlawful means. More broadly, it is questionable 
whether private law is committed to a principle against assertions of control per 
se.90 The courts “have never fashioned a tort of undue influence,” even though 
undue influence is a well-established legal concept and it is “a quintessential 
instance of control as Beever defines it.”91 In any event, the “control” criterion 
that he posits is arguably too vague to serve as an organizing principle of the 
economic torts.92 
Taking these objections further, another problem is that the indirect control 
account provides no principled reason to explain why the tort is confined to 
economic relations. Stevens, among other commentators, has claimed that this 
limitation is irrational.93 Yet, despite opportunities to do so, the courts have 
declined to extend the economic torts beyond the realm of commercial disputes.94 
In Frame v Smith, for instance, Wilson J explicitly denied the existence of a 
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“generalized tort of ‘wrongful interference with another’s relationship’.” She 
explained that the “common denominator of these torts is that they constitute 
wrongful interference with economic relationships.”95 But if control is the underlying 
rationale for the tort, presumably it should extend to all kinds of social 
relationships, not only those involving an “economic interest.”96 Apart from its 
inconsistency with the unlawful means element, the control theory leaves the 
tort’s domain unexplained, adding to the problems of fit. 
One potential response holds that the unlawful means tort is confined to 
economic relationships only because a statute has already “occupied the field” in 
other, non-economic contexts.97 That is, the characterization of the tort as strictly 
economic is contingent rather than necessary; at an abstract level, the tort can 
properly be understood as a response to the wrongfulness of indirect control. It 
is true that the majority in Frame v Smith held that any civil action relating to 
custody and access in family law matters was precluded because “the Legislature 
intended to devise a comprehensive scheme for dealing with these issues.”98 It 
might then be contended that the alleged problem of fit does not arise, since the 
tort could have extended to non-economic relationships but for this legislative 
policy. 
Nevertheless, only Wilson J expressly considered the domain of the 
unlawful means tort in Frame v Smith. In contrast to the majority, her refusal to 
extend the tort beyond the commercial context did not appear motivated by the 
presence of the legislated custody and access regime. Placing significance on the 
fact that tort law “up to this point has protected only certain types of relationships 
from interference,” Wilson J stated that the tort should not “be extended to a 
non-economic relationship.”99 Similarly, other courts have denied the extension 
of this tort to family relationships, not because of the existence of a statutory 
regime, but due to the essentially different nature of parental interests in their 
 
95 Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 at 129, Wilson J (dissenting but not on this point) [emphasis added] 
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children.100 Such interests cannot be analogized to the commercial or economic 
interests that the unlawful means tort protects. The indirect control theory 
remains inadequate in explaining the domain of this tort. In consequence, I 
conclude that Beever’s approach offers an unsatisfactory account. 
Liability Stretching 
In AI Enterprises, Cromwell J indicated his preference for the so-called 
“liability stretching” rationale for the unlawful means tort.101 This rationale holds 
that the tort is parasitic and “extend[s] civil liability without creating new 
actionable wrongs.”102 Instead of grounding a new tort liability, it “focuses on 
extending an existing right to sue from the immediate victim of the unlawful act 
to another party whom the defendant intended to target with the unlawful 
conduct.”103 Some have observed that “liability stretching,” however, is not 
actually a rationale, but a descriptive metaphor for the operation of the unlawful 
means tort.104 In other words, the metaphor does not itself justify the scope and 
content of the tort, though it does express certain assumptions about its 
underlying normative structure. 
Taken on its own terms, the “stretching” explanation is confused. Despite 
the claim that the rationale reflects Lord Hoffmann’s views in OBG,105 it is 
inconsistent with his description of the unlawful means tort as “a tort of primary 
liability.”106 In addition, Lord Hoffmann explicitly approved Lord Lindley’s 
statement in Quinn v Leatham that the rationale for the tort lies in its protection 
of “a person’s liberty or right to deal with others.”107 In contrast, the liability 
stretching thesis holds that the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant 
extends, or is stretched from, the third party’s right to sue.108 This is a secondary 
or accessory form of liability, which logically implies that the plaintiff should have 
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no claim if the defendant’s unlawful act causes no loss to the third party. Yet, AI 
Enterprises indicated that the unlawful means element encompasses not only 
actionable civil wrongs, but also “conduct that would be actionable if it had 
caused loss to the person at whom it was directed.”109 In that scenario, the 
immediate victim has no right to sue, and therefore nothing should extend to the 
plaintiff.110 
Furthermore, the rationale is inconsistent with the relational nature of 
liability.111 According to corrective justice, the defendant’s normative gain must 
correlate to the plaintiff’s normative loss to provide a reason for liability.112 The 
parties must be the “doer and sufferer of the same injustice.”113 Liability stretching 
ignores this requirement by permitting liability to arise from normative gains and 
losses involving “different and distinct harms.”114 The point is aptly demonstrated 
in Tarleton v M’Gawley (“Tarleton”), the very case that Cromwell J cites to illustrate 
his approach. In Tarleton, the defendant obtained a normative gain by firing a 
cannon at the third party canoers, who had been seeking to trade with the 
plaintiff.115 This gain, in conjunction with the normative loss to the canoers’ right 
to physical integrity, crystallized in the defendant’s liability for the canoers’ 
physical injury. In comparison, the plaintiff suffered a different normative loss in 
the form of an “economic harm distinct from those physical injuries.”116 Though 
Cromwell J argued that there is no reason to leave the plaintiff uncompensated,117 
the liability stretching rationale cannot be rationalized within a corrective justice 
framework. 
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THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS PROPOSAL 
Unlawful Interference as Abuse of Rights 
Departing from orthodox accounts that rely on policy considerations or the 
immediate victim’s rights, Neyers argues that the unlawful means tort is a 
manifestation of “the Kantian idea of the abuse of rights.”118 Briefly stated, the 
animating idea of this account is that persons are not permitted, within a “system 
of rights,” to inflict gratuitous harm upon others. Where a person deliberately 
aims to “frustrate the purposes of another,” he or she thereby commits an abuse 
of rights.119 These acts serve to transform rights “from markers of mutual 
freedom to instruments of subordination.”120 The unlawful means tort operates 
as “systematic control of the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights,” which 
protects the plaintiff from interference with his or her economic relations.121  
Such limitations accord with the “normative presuppositions” of a system of 
rights, because rights are the juridical means by which individuals pursue their 
own purposes.122 This understanding is consistent with the corrective justice 
framework, insofar as it elaborates the normative incidents of a system of juridical 
rights. 
The defendant is properly said to have abused her right only where he or 
she acts with the purpose of interfering “with the self-determining freedom of 
others.”123 This suggests a plausible account of the intention element of the 
unlawful means tort. Conversely, Neyers envisages a merely derivative role for 
the unlawful means element. In his view, this tort is simply the “indirect/complex 
form of an abuse of rights claim.”124 The paradigmatic instances of abuse of 
rights, he argues, lie in the prima facie tort cases. For example, he considers Tuttle 
v Buck to represent the “direct/simple form of an abusive rights claim,” where 
the defendant has the predominant purpose of injuring the plaintiff and involves 
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no intermediaries.125 The unlawful means element in the indirect form of the 
claim is justified as an evidentiary device that “rebut[s] the defendant’s claim that 
he or she was acting non-abusively” or without a legitimate intention.126 In effect, 
the account assimilates the requirement of an unlawful means to the intention 
element. 
While the appeal to the idea of a system of rights is promising, the account 
presented by Neyers is not without its challenges. The theory regards the unlawful 
means element as redundant. In principle, the defendant’s intention to abuse his 
or her right should suffice for liability. The unlawful means requirement is then 
relegated to an evidentiary role.127 But the theory’s emphasis on the defendant’s 
purposes then invites the objection that motive is irrelevant to liability in private 
law.128 As Lord Watson stated in Allen v Flood, “the existence of a bad motive, in 
the case of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil 
wrong.”129 Indeed, the rejection of the prima facie tort by English and Canadian 
courts underscores that an improper purpose, by itself, is not enough to found 
liability.130 
For this reason, it is difficult to see how the unlawful means tort can be 
characterized simply as the “indirect” variant of a “direct” action for abuse of 
rights. The derivative role given to unlawful means suggests a tenuous 
correspondence to the actual parameters of the tort. Moreover, this theory also 
inadequately explains why the tort is confined to interferences with economic 
relationships. On the view advanced by Neyers, an intentional indirect 
interference with any of the plaintiff’s interests—economic or otherwise—ought 
to constitute, prima facie, an abuse of rights. Therefore, like the other proposals, 
this account suffers from a problem of fit. It simultaneously accomplishes too 
much and too little, capturing conduct that does not ordinarily give rise to tortious 
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liability while leaving unresolved the tort’s focus on unlawful means and 
economic relationships. 
Systematicity and Specification 
In my view, the theory’s deficiencies of fit stem from a more fundamental 
problem. Because the abuse of rights theory conceives the tort just as “systematic 
control” of participants in the system of rights, it locates the gravamen of the tort 
in the defendant’s improper purposes. Put differently, the notion of an ‘abuse’ is 
vague, as commentators have noted;131 Neyers’ account of the tort appears to 
define abuse as encompassing any act performed with an improper purpose. In 
turn, it generates a justification for tortious liability whereby the prima facie tort 
becomes the paradigmatic case of abuse. This approach, in essence, directly 
models the parameters of the tort as a response to acting with an improper 
purpose per se. Viewed in this manner, the doctrine and the limitation on the 
exercise of freedoms it imposes are extrinsic to the scope and content of private 
rights. 
However, this conflicts with the idea that rights are, themselves, juridical 
markers of freedom that define the boundaries of legally permissible conduct.132 
Some have argued that abuse of right “is a juridically improper concept,” since it 
expresses no more than an “absence of right, i.e. ‘no-right’ and/or ‘duty not’.”133 
This objection is conceptual, for it points out that the notion of a right cannot 
comfortably coexist with a duty not to abuse the right, at least at the same level 
of abstraction. A right is an external, juridical manifestation of the internal 
capacity for purposive action.134 If the doctrine of abuse of rights is understood 
just to prohibit acting with improper motives, it undermines the concept of rights 
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itself. The notion of an abuse “becomes normatively prior to the existence and 
definition of the right, rendering the right illusory.”135 
From a corrective justice perspective, this conceptual objection can be 
related to the correlativity of rights and duties. Rights and duties each have 
“distinct moral characters [even] while functioning together as a unity.”136 
Conversely, it might be thought that a right is merely a reflex of a duty, so that 
“the entire justificatory weight of the relationship rests on the reason for 
considering the defendant to be under a duty.”137 Taking the defendant’s 
improper purposes to constitute liability does precisely this. It frames the notion 
of abuse of rights “at a level of abstraction that is too high to reflect the specific 
and distinctive character of the legal relation in private law.”138 As a result, it 
superimposes the notion onto the scheme of private rights and duties in a manner 
that constrains these juridical expressions of freedom, contrary to the corrective 
justice approach. On that approach, rights are embodiments of the fundamental 
principle “that one person’s action [must] be united with the other’s freedom in 
accordance with practical reason.”139 That is, rights are conclusions to practical 
reasoning, not premises subject to further considerations of “abuse”: “[a] right 
gives its holder the freedom to act within its bounds.”140 Only if a right is the 
product of such reasoning can it be relied upon as a “normative marker of the 
parties’ relationship.”141 
Accordingly, the key difficulty for the abuse of rights theory is that it is 
incomplete in an important respect. In my view, the systematicity of rights should 
be seen to partially constitute the scheme of rights and duties. The doctrine of 
abuse of rights does not directly impose a cause of action in itself, as Neyers 
suggests, so that an improper purpose alone grounds liability. Rather, abuse of 
rights is akin to an organizing principle that pertains to interpersonal transactions 
in a system of rights.142 As such, it still calls for a proper specification of the 
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defendant’s duty not to ‘abuse’ a right and, by extension, the plaintiff’s right 
correlative to this duty. The right-duty relationships subsisting in private law, 
then, should incorporate the normative incidents of systematicity as part of their 
internal scope and content.143 Thus understood, liability would be founded on the 
infringement of “rights, not purposes, which define the nature of the coexistence 
the law requires.”144 
If abuse of right is abstractly defined as the defendant’s deliberate 
undertaking to frustrate the plaintiff’s juridical freedom, what does this entail in 
the context of economic relationships, the domain peculiar to the unlawful means 
tort? Once the tort is analyzed with a view to the plaintiff’s right, it shall become 
clear that “the gist of the action [is] not malicious intention but violation of a legal 
right committed knowingly.”145 In this manner, a refined and fully specified 
account will be able to distinguish between motive, ill-will, or malice, on the one 
hand, and the intention to misuse one’s means, on the other. A system of rights 
refuses to legitimize an abuse of right not because the defendant acted from an 
impure motive, but because she conscripted her juridical means as “instruments of 
subordination.”146 
EXTENDING THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS PROPOSAL 
The Right to Trade 
In what follows, I elaborate upon this appeal to the systematicity of rights 
to provide a novel account of the unlawful means tort, which will elucidate the 
tort’s compatibility with the corrective justice framework. I consider the form of 
the plaintiff’s right protected by the unlawful means tort and argue that it is the 
“right to trade.” Then, I discuss the content of this right as informed by corrective 
justice’s account of “public right,” the condition in which private law rights are 
secured by public institutions. Examining corrective justice’s conception of rights 
and remedies reveals a coherent justification of the unlawful means tort, based in 
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persons’ equal status under the “juridical conception of markets,” an omnilateral 
structure of impersonal relations between persons pursuing their own 
purposes.147 
To begin, I return to the concept of the “right to trade,” described as the 
“oldest potential justification” for the unlawful means tort.148 In Quinn v Leathem, 
Lord Lindley expressed the idea that tort law protects such a right: 
This liberty is a right recognised by law; its correlative is the 
general duty of everyone not to prevent the free exercise of this 
liberty, except so far as his own liberty of action may justify him 
in so doing. But a person’s liberty or right to deal with others is 
nugatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they 
choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with 
him affects him.149 
Notably, Lord Hoffmann approvingly cited this passage in OBG, describing it as 
the “rationale of this tort.”150 Lord Lindley’s opinion is of particular interest 
because among all the judgments in the House of Lords in Quinn v Leathem, his 
distinguishes itself by its rights-based orientation. He considered it essential that 
“the interference is wrongful and is intended to damage” the plaintiff, as opposed 
to conduct that was “justifiable in point of law” and hence exempt from 
liability.151 On the facts of the case, he found that the defendant’s actions had 
“infringed the plaintiff’s rights so as to give him a cause of action.”152  
Despite the apparent endorsement in OBG, some commentators object to 
the existence of a right to trade. For example, Neyers argues that “it is not 
conceptually possible to have a right to trade in a capitalist society (as this would 
entail a duty not to compete).”153 It is important to appreciate the pedigree of this 
critique. The analysis originates from Hohfeld, who criticized Lord Lindley’s 
reasoning for invoking a non sequitur; he claimed it was incoherent to derive the 
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existence of a correlative duty from a mere liberty to deal with others.154 Whereas 
Lord Lindley posited the existence of a general “duty” not to interfere, the logical 
Hohfeldian correlative of a “liberty” to trade is that everyone has “no-right” to 
claim that the liberty-holder cannot trade.155 Thus, it was suggested that he erred 
by conflating the permission that the law gave to Leathem to carry on the trade 
of butcher, with the “duty of every one not to prevent” his trade.156 The latter 
formulation seems to imply that a competitor entering the marketplace could 
infringe another’s right to trade by depriving his competitor of customers.157 
Hence, the “right to trade” is often considered a misguided basis for the tort, 
since a business owner cannot have a right to one’s customers.158 
Strictly speaking, however, the Hohfeldian objection is misplaced. As 
Halpin has shown, Hohfeld’s concept of a “liberty” elides the distinction between 
“the absence of a duty not to do the privileged act” and “recognition and 
protection by the law in doing the act.”159 The former is merely a “no-duty.” In 
contrast, the latter describes a freedom to do something that is positively 
protected by law.160 For example, when speaking of the “liberty” of a landowner 
to enter her land, there are two possible meanings. One is that by entering, the 
landowner is not in breach of a duty to anyone. The other is that the law 
“positively protect[s]” the landowner’s entitlement to enter by ensuring that she 
cannot be ejected for trespass.161 
The operative meaning in Quinn v Leathem was the latter, since Lord Lindley 
could not be taken to have asserted that Leathem had “no-duty” to trade as a 
butcher. The point is that the Hohfeldian concept of a liberty is laden with a set 
of underlying rights; the legal protection conferred by it “can be broken down 
into a set of rights with correlative duties.”162 In spite of this, Hohfeld asserted 
that it was nonsensical to correlate a duty with a liberty. That assertion would 
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have been correct if Lord Lindley had attempted to correlate “the general duty of 
everyone” with a “no-duty” on Leathem’s part to carry on his trade.163 But he 
clearly did not. The related objection, that the correlative duty must be a duty not 
to deprive the plaintiff of his customers and is hence unworkable, ignores the fact 
that his liberty to trade is merely a liberty to attempt to trade with others. It does 
not entail that the plaintiff must be successful in his endeavours to carry on a 
trade, in the sense of being commercially profitable.164 
Accordingly, I argue that Lord Lindley, by referring to “a person’s liberty or 
right to deal with others,” was not suggesting that the law would protect his profit 
margins from other competitors. In other words, he was not declaring the 
existence of a duty not to compete. Instead, in the earlier words of Bowen LJ in 
Mogul Steamship, he was simply affirming that “the law recognises and encourages” 
the capacity of a person to lawfully participate in the market.165 As discussed, the 
“right to trade” might simply refer to a set of protections that the law accords to 
market participants, which enable them to attempt to deal with others. These 
include the prohibition of certain illegitimate business practices,166 and the scope 
of protection for persons who endeavour to carry on a trade may be considered 
“[t]he dividing line between lawful competition . . . and unlawful competition.”167 
That is a possibility Neyers and other critics regrettably did not consider, 
since they exclude the notion that the right to trade is “a measured or limited right” 
that constrains certain kinds of competitive behaviour but not others.168 The 
oversight is likely motivated by Hohfeld’s all-or-nothing assumption that a liberty 
must refer either to the absence of a duty on the plaintiff to carry on a trade, or 
else, to the legal capacity to carry on a successful enterprise. Far from it being a 
conceptual impossibility for the “liberty to trade” to be correlative to a duty, it is 
eminently logical to consider whether it encompasses “a set of protecting rights” 
which prevent interference with this liberty.169 In this sense, one can theorize the 
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plaintiff’s right to trade and the defendant’s correlative duty not to unlawfully 
interfere, as forming the right-duty relationship that inheres in the unlawful means 
tort. 
The Condition of Public Right 
Having dispelled the conceptual objection to the “right to trade,” it is 
possible to specify this right, not merely as a reflex of the duty not to interfere 
with the plaintiff’s trade, but as a distinct “juridical manifestation[ ] of the freedom 
inherent in self-determining agency.”170 I contend that the legal interests and 
protections underlying the right to trade may be reconciled with the corrective 
justice framework through the Kantian idea of “public right.” Although Neyers 
uses “public right” to denote rights created by the criminal law,171 in using this 
term I invoke corrective justice’s understanding of the “public character of 
private law.”172 
According to Weinrib, “public right” is the “condition in which public 
institutions actualize and guarantee rights.”173 The idea is that the effects of 
private rights are altered once they are protected and enjoyed under public 
institutions:174 
public right . . . integrates these rights into a public and systematic 
totality of persons, norms, and institutions, thereby moving 
from bilateral relationships, in which each right (as well as its 
correlative duty) stands on its own, to the omnilateral relationship 
among members of a state, in which the rights and correlative 
duties become constituents of a comprehensive whole.175 
The two features of public right, publicness and systematicity, pertain 
“respectively to the form and content of public right.” Publicness, the formal 
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aspect of public right, refers to the condition of legal norms being known by all. 
Systematicity, its substantive aspect, bears on the understanding of legal norms 
and institutions as forming a systematic whole.176 Together, these features 
“provide a court with a new principle of decision based on the omnilateral 
standpoint of a public institution” that supplements the bilateral relationships of 
corrective justice.177 
 It is in this condition that the notion of abuse of rights is realized.178 
When private law norms are made systematic, the effect of a private right may be 
extended or attenuated.179 Weinrib suggests, for example, that contractual rights 
come to enjoy an in rem protection because “public right makes the contract a 
juridical object for everyone” in a system of reciprocal assurance “that relates all 
to all.”180 This development is thought to underpin the tort of inducing breach of 
contract. It is significant, then, that Lord Lindley drew an analogy between the 
unlawful means tort and the principle underlying Lumley v Gye, the case that 
established the tort of inducing breach of contract.181 The general notion of abuse 
of rights is similarly grounded in the omnilateral, systematic nature of public right. 
Because a person is related to everyone else in this condition, systematicity 
imposes requirements to uphold “the rightful form of association” of individuals, 
that is, public right’s “own integrating conception of a people, of its laws, and of 
its institutions.”182 Accordingly, it prohibits the anti-social act of using one’s rights 
as “instruments of subordination” by purposefully inflicting gratuitous harm on 
and frustrating the freedoms of another.183 
 The significance of public right to the unlawful means tort, I argue, lies 
in the connection between the “right to trade” and a legal system’s stance against 
abuse of rights. In the case of an unlawful interference with economic relations, 
the defendant has committed what can be broadly characterized as an abuse of 
right. But whereas Neyers’ theory sees the defendant’s wrongful purpose as the 
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gravamen of the tort, I suggest that the liability responds to a more specific kind 
of inconsistency with public right. The effect of systematicity is not to replace the 
set of juridical freedoms that prevailed prior to the condition of public right, but 
rather, to add a new “layer of analysis that . . . leaves intact” those right-duty 
relationships.184 
In the case of the unlawful means tort, the normative implications of this 
new layer derive from the form of market relations, which is only fully recognized 
under public right. Like all the economic torts, this tort is oriented toward 
interferences of economic and commercial relations. As I will argue, the 
corrective justice approach does implicate a particular understanding of such 
relations. The “juridical conception of market transactions” is a form of 
omnilateral relation in which persons are entitled to use or dispose of their means 
as they see fit.185 Interactions in the juridical market are impersonal, consistent 
with the conception of personality that pervades private law, for within the 
market everyone is influenced by everyone while “all act to pursue ends of their 
own.”186 In this respect, the juridical market accords to each participant an equal 
status. As persons transact impersonally and are related omnilaterally, “they all 
rank equally as persons whose activities can coexist within the system of 
rights.”187 To be sure, the juridical conception of the market is an abstract and 
idealized image of actual market transactions, but one which is appropriate to the 
juridical conception of personhood and its focus on the external manifestation of 
choice.188 
When the defendant employs unlawful means with the intent to utilize 
the mechanisms of the market to harm the plaintiff, he has acted inconsistently 
with the plaintiff’s equal status as a participant in this juridical market. The court 
acknowledges this subversion of market relations as an injury correlative to the 
plaintiff’s right to trade. As such, the tort responds to “the targeting of the 
plaintiff by the defendant through the instrumentality of unlawful acts against a third 
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party.”189 Like the form of the market itself, which is impersonal and omnilateral, 
the right to trade is a product of public right that links everyone to everyone as a 
specified form of the “correlative universal right” that imposes “systematic 
control” against abuse of rights.190 This treatment flows from the need to uphold 
the juridical conception of the market. In turn, as I shall explain, this conception 
is essential to the understanding of rights and remedies under corrective justice. 
Corrective Justice and the Market 
Latent within corrective justice’s conception of private rights and remedies 
is the idea of the omnilateral relationship that public right makes explicit. As 
opposed to accounts that view a right as the mere causative event of a remedy, 
corrective justice posits that a remedy is the continuation of the plaintiff’s injured 
right. It accordingly conceives an award of monetary damages as restoring to the 
plaintiff the quantitative form of that right.191 This “thesis of continuity” reflects 
the internal coherence of a system of rights, in that at all times, the plaintiff 
maintains her entitlement to possess her right, whether in its original or remedial 
form.192 Like the right of which it is a continuation, a remedy expresses the law’s 
“concern for equal liberty and security for all.”193 
According to the continuity thesis, the substance of the remedy is seen as 
the same as that of the underlying right. Since rights are juridical means by which 
a person can pursue her purposes externally in the world, the remedy must have 
a similarly external manifestation.194 This provides an answer to the objection, for 
instance, that a mere apology by the defendant could satisfy the remedial demands 
of corrective justice.195 An apology, being solely a reflection of a defendant’s 
inward, subjective state, would not restore to the plaintiff her injured right since 
it does not restore the external means that she lost.196 By setting aside such 
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internal considerations, private law embraces terms of interaction that recognize 
the parties as free and equal in respect of their juridical personality.197 
Monetary damages are an appropriate way to restore what the plaintiff has 
lost, because money is the “universal means by which men exchange their 
industriousness with one another.”198 Put differently, the corrective justice theory 
perceives the violation of a private right to be wrongful because rights are 
“juridical markers of the freedom” to pursue one’s ends or projects in the 
world.199 When rights are violated, the plaintiff is deprived of the external means 
by which he can pursue his ends; money substitutes for and remedies the injured 
right by restoring to the plaintiff those means. As discussed above, for corrective 
justice, there is an equivalence between the right and the remedy, insofar as both 
embody a person’s “self-determining freedom.”200 The equivalence of means and 
money follows, because money is the universal form of value, which can be 
exchanged for almost any other means.201 In this way, damages reflect private 
law’s mode of social ordering, based on fair terms of interaction.202 
An important postulate of this system of remedies is the idea of a market. 
Corrective justice posits an equivalence between right and remedy, as well as the 
effectiveness of monetary damages as a remedy. From this perspective, such 
damages must be capable of serving as substitutes for one’s means.203 If a sum of 
money could not be assimilated to one’s external means and used to further one’s 
purposes, such as by being exchanged for external acquisitions, the remedy could 
not truly restore the plaintiff’s right. Such a situation would be inconsistent with 
the condition of public right, which purports to ensure that rights are public, 
systematic, and enforceable.204 In order to do so, a juridical idea of the market 
must be inherent in the system of rights, since the remedy, money, must be 
capable of being converted to other means of equivalent value. This attributes to 
the remedy an objective existence, similar to the right of which it is another 
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form.205 Valuation, in turn, depends on the existence of a “community of 
exchange,” in the form of the market.206 
The relevant conception of the market expresses the juridical personality of 
the transacting individuals.207 In the condition of public right, the abstraction 
from persons’ needs, wishes, or advantage intrinsic to the juridical standpoint 
takes on a new, constitutive dimension. Under a system of rights, this abstraction 
has a universalizing character, in that all participants are reciprocally and formally 
related to one another. They are taken to exist and interact together in a form of 
civil society, in virtue of their common possession of wants and needs, though 
each person’s particular wants and needs are different.208 That is, the fact that 
abstract persons transact with one another to satisfy their particular, concrete 
needs constitutes the juridical market as a purely horizontal ordering of 
interpersonal relations. As part of this ordering, they recognize themselves “as 
persons with particular and separate interests that they viewed as their own and 
wanted to pursue.”209 As such, the juridical conception of markets has both an 
impersonal and omnilateral feature. It is a distinctive normative space, a 
“universality appropriate to the relations between concrete persons pursuing their 
separate interests and particular ends.”210 
This market is an abstract, universalizing form of relations immanent in 
public right. Given the equivalence between money and means that corrective 
justice posits, the market can itself be considered as a kind of means for the 
pursuit of one’s purposes. Tort law, supplemented by considerations of 
systematicity, serves to uphold this mode of ordering. In this manner, public right 
informs the content of the “right to trade.” When a person deliberately targets 
another “through the instrumentality of unlawful acts against a third party,”211 
she imperils this mode of ordering. This act implicates the plaintiff’s right to trade, 
which embodies a relation of status as an equal participant under this conception 
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of markets. Public right attributes to everyone an equal status to participate in the 
juridical market and refuses to legitimize acts that deliberately frustrate the 
operation of the market. 
From this status flows certain rights and duties, which reflect the fair terms 
of interaction under its form of private ordering. In Lord Lindley’s words, the 
impersonal form of market relations entails a person’s “liberty to earn his own 
living in his own way, provided he did not violate some special law prohibiting 
him from so doing, and provided he did not infringe the rights of other 
people.”212 This statement captures two features essential to the juridical 
conception of markets. These two rationales underpin the right to trade, a right 
that applies equally to all and places a party, as Bowen LJ stated, “at no special 
disadvantage as compared with others.”213 First, as discussed, market relations are 
impersonal. Persons participate in the market to exchange their means, and their 
particular, separate, inward purposes are relevant only insofar as each person’s 
means are a proxy for those purposes. 
Second, persons must be able to enjoy their holdings, proprietary and 
contractual, securely. This presupposes that persons can engage in commercial 
relations against a general background of lawful interaction. As Deakin and 
Randall note, the market is embedded in rules of the common law.214 For 
instance, private law recognizes the freedom that owners of property have “to 
enjoy the bargaining position that another’s preferences independently produce,” 
but not to any specific object of their desires or to exercise jurisdiction over the 
means of another.215 The valuation of means, and the effectiveness of a remedy, 
that corrective justice presupposes are only possible where persons’ holdings and 
transactions are made reliably secure under a public regime of laws. The unlawful 
means tort responds to an attempt to subvert the terms of fair interaction. It 
prevents a defendant from exploiting the omnilateral form of the market, by 
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injuring a third party, to deny others the equal freedom to pursue their purposes 
and ends.216 
Equality of Opportunity and the Right to Trade 
As a matter of public right, a court preserves rights and remedies as markers 
of freedom by upholding the form of relations appropriate to the market. In my 
view, the protection of the integrity of the juridical market is the justification for 
the unlawful means tort. A person who commits an independently actionable 
wrong against a third party, with the intention to target another, disrupts this 
mode of social ordering. The systematicity of a condition of public right attributes 
to each person an equal status to participate in the juridical market. When the 
cause of action is established, the court awards damages commensurate to the 
plaintiff’s economic injury, which restores to her the factual, pecuniary incidents 
of the right that she had lost. In this sense, everyone has an equal opportunity to 
utilize and exchange one’s means in the pursuit of her own purposes. The right 
to trade embodies that status and is correlative to a duty not to abuse the right, a 
duty “to leave them in the undisturbed enjoyment of their liberty of action.”217 
As such, it is not a “classically delineated” private right—a right to one’s 
reputation, bodily integrity, or property—but a right with a public element.218 
This proposed account of the unlawful means tort does not imply acceptance of 
a prima facie tort. It is not founded on the unjustified infliction of economic loss, 
but rather, the interference with the equal status of juridical persons under public 
right. In truth, the imposition of liability to uphold rights with public elements is 
not unknown to private law. The common law has long acknowledged the 
existence of a “law of the realm,” which imposes duties on members of certain 
professions toward the public.219 For example, the “common calling” cases and 
 
216 See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 171. 
217 Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 537. 
218 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 183. 
219 Amnon Reichman, “Professional Status and the Freedom to Contract: Toward a Common Law Duty of 
Non-Discrimination” (2001) 14:1 Can JL & Jur 79 at 90 [“Professional Status”]. 
200 CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND THE UNLAWFUL MEANS TORT Vol. 28 
 
 
cases involving property “affected with a public interest,” fall within this category, 
articulating qualifications on the scope of private rights.220 
Such duties are not strictly contractual, but “are akin to obligations which 
flow from assuming a status.”221 In the case of a common calling, the profession 
is non-associational in nature, in that it is “constituted around transactions with 
abstract customers,” or customers who are not conceptualized in terms of their 
personal characteristics. As Reichman argues, certain professions, such as 
innkeepers and common carriers, by their nature cannot simply pick and choose 
their customers. They hold themselves out as serving the general public, carrying 
on business in an impersonal manner.222 The ideal of publicness and orientation 
toward an abstract customer is a constitutive, and not merely regulative, feature 
of those professions. Just as membership in a profession entails status-based 
obligations, the juridical market confers an equal status on all participants, which 
gives rise to the right to trade. 
By protecting this status, the unlawful means tort can be said to protect a 
kind of equality of opportunity. In this vein, it has been suggested that the tort 
operates to delineate the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate 
competition, thereby “maintain[ing] the integrity of the competitive process.”223 
From the juridical standpoint, however, the tort’s function is basic and formal, as 
opposed to substantive. In my view, it simply ensures that persons are afforded 
an equal opportunity to endeavour to carry on trade or business within a structure 
of “basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition” that,224 at 
least from the perspective of private law, secures for everyone a means of 
impersonal exchange. No person can employ unlawful means to deprive another 
of their status, or formal opportunity to participate in the market. The rights and 
duties accruing from a status are not purely private, in that they do not arise as a 
normative incident of juridical personality alone.225 The right to trade considers 
persons “as members of civil society, that individuals are recognized as vested 
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with this equal right.”226 In other words, it presupposes the existence of a 
collectivity, or the “integrating conception of a people” under public right.227 
Despite this quasi-public dimension, the unlawful means tort provides a basis for 
formal equality of opportunity that is ultimately compatible with the theory of 
corrective justice.228 
APPLYING THE ABUSE OF RIGHT THEORY 
Unlawful Means 
Because the juridical market constitutes an omnilateral relationship between 
persons, rather than between the individual and the state, the right to trade 
pertains only to interpersonal wrongs. In consequence, the right to trade is 
implicated only when a person’s capacity to independently pursue her purposes 
is interfered with by an independently actionable wrong. In this manner, the 
justification for the unlawful means tort differs somewhat from the “fair 
competition” rationale advanced by others. Kain and Alexander, for instance, 
analogize the market to a “game” where liability is imposed for “cheating” the 
competitive rules.229 Although the market and a “game” might resemble each 
other, the latter is different in that it presupposes the existence of a higher norm, 
above the players, that governs fair play. The relationship between the putative 
player and the notional authority that determines “the rules of a game,”230 such 
as an umpire or the Competition Bureau, is vertical and bilateral, rather than 
horizontal and omnilateral. The “cheating” theory of the tort, then, only 
approximates the form of relations constituted by public right. 
As Cromwell J has also noted, “[i]f the primary purpose of the tort were to 
uphold the institution of market competition, it would be irrelevant whether the 
interference was intentional or negligent,” since presumably, parties could 
unknowingly engage in anti-competitive or externality-creating behaviour.231 On 
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my proposed account, the tort has a less ambitious role. Tortious liability is not 
responsive to the internal needs or wishes of competitors, nor to the 
maximization of market competition. Rather, it simply ensures a formal 
opportunity to transact as a juridical person equal in standing to others. In 
contrast, if the fair competition rationale were accepted, it would be 
counterproductive to maintain the intention element of the tort. To do so would 
generate the seemingly perverse result that “a defendant will be protected from 
liability by his own ignorance . . . or even stupidity.”232 On the grounds of fit and 
coherence, these considerations militate against the view that the economic torts 
serve to optimize the competitive features of the market.233 
Moreover, to broaden the unlawful means element beyond the requirement 
of an interpersonal wrong would potentially assimilate private law disputes to 
distributive functions. Such an approach is contrary to the corrective justice 
understanding of private law adjudication. As the Privy Council aptly observed in 
a conflict of laws case: 
All the provisions of Municipal Statutes for the regulation of 
trade and trading companies are presumably enacted in the 
interest and for the benefit of the community at large; and 
persons who violate these provisions are, in a certain sense, 
offenders against the state law, as well as against individuals who 
may be injured by their misconduct.234 
Thus, much of the regulation of competition belongs to the distributive function 
of the legislature, which acts for the community. Recognition of this difference 
between common law and legislated rights explains the concerns about 
“tortifying” the criminal law. Lord Hoffmann, for example, warned of creating 
liability for “something which is wrongful for reasons which have nothing to do 
with the damage inflicted on the claimant,” and hence is not an interpersonal 
wrong.235 
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It may be tempting to object that it is “passing strange that a breach of 
contract should be proscribed but not a crime” under the unlawful means tort.236 
However, this argument erroneously presupposes that any criminal activity is 
more wrongful than an actionable civil wrong. To the contrary, conduct is often 
proscribed by the criminal law on the basis of a legislative judgment made from 
“a general social perspective,” that is to say, a perspective of distributive justice.237 
While the unlawful means tort is confined to economic relationships, it is not 
concerned with distributive purposes. 
As I have argued, the underlying justification of the unlawful means tort is 
that it secures to each person their equal status in the juridical market, which is 
constituted by public right. The community of interaction constituted by public 
right is an interpersonal ordering that “relates each person to every other 
person.”238 The requirement that the unlawful means be visited upon a third party 
reflects the tort’s purpose, which is to respond to an attempt to undermine this 
omnilateral form of relations through the mechanisms of the market itself. The 
narrow scope given to the unlawful means element accords with this account. 
Since public right adds, but does not substitute, “a new principle of decision” or 
a “layer of analysis” to private rights,239 it does not purport to expand the scope 
of tortious liability on the basis of distributive considerations. Those 
considerations, which are extrinsic to the relations between the subjects of public 
right, are the domain of the legislature rather than the court. 
Intention 
At the same time, it is insufficient for liability that an independently 
actionable wrong occurs to the third party. Unless a defendant determines to 
target the plaintiff, a violation of the right to trade has not occurred, because it 
cannot be said that he has transformed the structure of the market into an 
instrument of subordination.240 The abuse of rights theory views the subversion 
of the plaintiff’s equal status in the market as the wrong. Because the juridical 
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market is an ordering of impersonal relations, the plaintiff’s right protects her 
status to transact impersonally with others, without their regard for her particular 
purposes or identity. For this reason, liability only accrues where the defendant 
possesses the intention to target the plaintiff. In employing unlawful means 
against a third party with this intention, the defendant has singled out the plaintiff 
in a manner inconsistent with the impersonal quality of the juridical market: the 
defendant acts to visit harm upon this particular person. 
Seen in this light, the account supports Lord Hoffmann’s distinction in OBG 
“between ends, means and consequences.”241 The wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s action is found not in any personal animus against the plaintiff, but 
rather in the commitment to the purpose of striking at him; mere negligence or 
foreseeability of loss does not posit an inconsistency between the defendant’s 
freedom and the right to trade of others.242 Indeed, since corrective justice 
understands liability as a response to an interpersonal wrong, the identity of the 
particular plaintiff and defendant are always relevant. In this sense, it is coherent 
to theorize the intention element as involving the targeting of a specific, 
identifiable person.243 As Beever suggests, it is not that “the defendant must target 
the harm to the plaintiff . . . [but] that the defendant must target the plaintiff” 
through the unlawful means.244 The existence of this intention can be determined 
objectively, by asking whether it manifests to a reasonable person a singling out 
of the plaintiff. Furthermore, because the element of intentionality does not 
require “balancing” the public utility of the defendant’s act against the plaintiff’s 
interests, the imposition of liability is judicial and not legislative.245 
On this account, it is apparent that the role of the intention element is 
neither a remoteness-bridging device nor an ingredient of liability stretching. It 
does not prop up a cause of action for an existing wrong, so to speak, but forms 
part of the defendant’s wrongful conduct against the plaintiff itself. A full 
appreciation of Lord Lindley’s reasons in Quinn v Leathem supports this refined 
view. He stated that if the plaintiff “is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through 
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others,” the “damage is not remote or unforeseen.”246 But while Stilitz and Sales 
relied on this statement to justify their theory, the passage in Quinn v Leathem in 
fact emphasizes the plaintiff’s rights: 
. . . the whole aspect of the case is changed: the wrong done to 
others reaches him, his rights are infringed although indirectly, and 
damage to him is not remote or unforeseen, but is the direct 
consequence of what has been done.247 
Read more fully, it strongly suggests he held that remoteness was overcome by 
reason of the infringement of the right, rather than intention alone. Of course, 
this approach is consistent with the account based on the right to trade. 
Incidentally, this understanding of the tort explains its confinement to the 
domain of economic relationships. The right to trade is an embodiment of the 
plaintiff’s equal status under the juridical conception of markets. In the case of 
family or social relationships, the persons involved do not relate to each other as 
abstract individuals, but as individuals with particular desires and ends. Such 
relationships cannot properly be characterized as omnilateral or impersonal. 
Therefore, no breach of the right to trade can be invoked in these contexts. The 
significance of the commercial context also provides good reason to believe that 
Lord Hoffmann was correct to be especially concerned “not only with the legal 
quality of the unlawful means . . . but also with their effect in interfering with a third 
party’s freedom of economic action.”248 In contrast, Cromwell J dismissed the relevance 
of this “freedom to deal” qualification because he perceived it purely as an 
instrument to limit the scope of the tort; he considered that the unlawful means 
element sufficed to limit liability.249 Although it has been criticized as irrelevant 
to “the rationale for imposing liability,” the rights-based theory of the tort offered 
here accounts for the role of the “freedom to deal” element.250 
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This paper has argued that a fuller specification of the abuse of rights theory 
provides a coherent account of the tort of unlawful interference with economic 
relations, and moreover, that the tort is compatible with corrective justice. From 
that perspective, the tort appeared to be problematic due to the unclear role of 
the plaintiff’s right, the predominant focus on the defendant’s purposes, and the 
suggestion that it reflects considerations of distributive justice. Having reviewed 
various proposed justifications for the tort, I contended that the most promising 
approach was the abuse of rights theory and its invocation of the idea of a system 
of rights. This paper developed the conception of public right, remedies, and the 
juridical market in order to fully specify the right underlying the tort. 
In virtue of the continuity of rights and remedies, a juridical conception of 
markets is immanent in the corrective justice outlook. The unlawful means tort 
protects the plaintiff’s right to trade, a right flowing from a person’s equal status 
in the juridical market. On this account, it is evident that the tort does, in fact, 
accord with the normative presuppositions of corrective justice. First, the right 
to trade underlies the triangular form of the tort, since it responds to the 
defendant’s wrong against the plaintiff and not a third party. Second, the right-
duty relationship that inheres in the tort is consistent with the correlative nature 
of liability. The defendant’s intention to target, or single out, the plaintiff through 
the instrumentality of a third party forms an articulated unity with the plaintiff’s 
capacity to transact impersonally in the condition of public right. Finally, this 
account justifies the scope of the unlawful means element on the basis of norms 
of horizontal ordering, rather than on considerations of distributive justice. It is 
submitted, then, that corrective justice does contain the normative resources to 
explain the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations. 
 
